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Culture of  Secrecy*
Dusko Doder
USA 
In his book, Secrecy and Democracy, the former director of U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency raised the issue that is at the heart of
a debate over America’s intelligence services. The spy service
under his control, he wrote, “strongly resisted my efforts to employ
it to take the pulse of foreign countries; first, because semi-covert
collection was not in its tradition, and such activity was not con-
sidered espionage by the professionals. Second, because the CIA
had become too accustomed to living and working in comfortable
cities abroad; not enough of its people were out in the remote
areas.”1
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet empire, the CIA finds
itself fighting for its institutional life. It stands accused by former
top intelligence chiefs of having failed the mission for which it was
founded: to provide political leaders with accurate assessments of
the political, economic, and military state of the Soviet Union.
Writing later about this “enormous failure”, Turner made an
extraordinary assertion in a 1991 Foreign Affairs article: “I have
never heard a suggestion from the CIA, or the intelligence arms
of the departments of defense or state, that numerous Soviets rec-
ognized a growing, systemic economic decay.”2
The Agency, another critic wrote, was left “virtually in the dark
about the Soviet bloc’s political, economic, and societal decay, as
well as the speed with which Communism would collapse in
Eastern Europe.” The CIA had kept overestimating the performa-
ce of the Soviet economy, “leading many to speculate that the
numbers were hyped to fuel the arms race.”3
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a former vice chairman of
the Senate Intelligence Committee, made an even more sweeping
statement: “For a quarter century,” he said, “the CIA has been
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epeatedly wrong about the major political and economic ques-
tions entrusted to its analysis.”4
And another high official, General William Odom, former
director of the National Security Agency, proposed that the CIA
should be disbanded: “You could close down the DDI
(Intelligence Analysis Directorate) tomorrow and nobody would
miss it. The only serious issue here is whether you want to contin-
ue to pay all these people. I guess you keep idle intelligentsia off
the streets. I consider by and large their analytical effort a welfare
transfer package.”5
Such harsh judgments by the men responsible for U.S. intelli-
gence are astonishing, especially since they suggest that igno-
rance prevailed within what was supposed to be our most capa-
ble service, and existed particularly in the scrutiny of its primary
target. Before proceeding any further, I would like to state that I
disagree with the above quoted gentlemen.
Judgements about the CIA’s performance must be placed in
context of time – the decline and collapse of the Soviet Union.
They also must take into account an inconvenient, yet basic aspect
of espionage: all intelligence services serve their political masters.
Or to use a more colorful way of saying it (to quote one of the
prominent participants in this round table) “however sharp may be
the instincts of an intelligence service, it is always the toy of the
government it services.”6 Indeed, in my judgement, the problems
that led to the decline in the agency’s prestige and self-image
were caused  by the misuse of the CIA by its political masters,
especially during the Nixon and Reagan administrations. The
White House tapes reveal that Nixon’s efforts to use the CIA for
domestic political purposes – a clear violation of the law – were
thwarted by its long-time director, Richard Helms, a career CIA
officer.
This is the basic problem. Intelligence services exist to a large
extent to do the dirty work which politicians want executed, but for
which they do not want to shoulder responsibility. The CIA has
long been the favorite scapegoat for various failures. It is easy to
blame – since, by the very nature of  its work, it cannot fight back
in public.
But this is only a part of the problem. The other part is the
CIA’s obsession with secrecy, and its fascination with being covert,
which has undermined its effectiveness. The agency operates
under constraints it has created for itself. Secrecy both protects
and blinds it.
What are these self-imposed constraints?
One is the Agency’s culture of secrecy. It does not collect
information unless it is secret. Anecdotal evidence shows the ludi-
crous extent of this attitude. Columnist Lars-Erik Nelson reported



























had died. Top officials who had gathered in the White House tried
to assess the situation just as Radio Havana was announcing that
Castro had just granted an interview to a group of Mexican jour-
nalists. “Someone at the meeting looked at the CIA rep and asked
if we had called the Mexican to verify the report,” Nelson wrote.
“The CIA guy, said, ’We don’t do covert collection’.”
Another is its long-range approach. Despite all the movies
and books about devil-may-care, swashbuckling agents, U.S.
spies almost universally are engaged in banal paper work under
diplomatic cover. They operate inside embassies, live in special
compounds, and are content to do their work by proxy. They sit in
their offices unwilling, and in many cases unable, to wander
around their host country and talk with local inhabitants. They
have to avoid such contact for fear of eventual problems with the
polygraph. In Moscow, for example, any “fraternization” with
Russian nationals was immediately regarded as potential “con-
tamination”.
From this flows a variety of problems that burden the Agency.
Frequently, CIA officers are not even linguistically equipped to do
their work. I knew the CIA station chief in Moscow – at the height
of the Cold War in the early 1980s – and he was unable to even
say “good morning” in Russian. This was not an isolated case.
Reuel Gerecht, a former CIA officer, notes in his book that at the
time “the American embassy was taken over in Iran in 1979, not
a single Agency officer in Tehran spoke Persian.”7 Now, accord-
ing to one government source, if you want to know who the agents
are in the U.S. embassy, look for the ones who don’t speak the
language.
By contrast, regular foreign service officers (in my experience,
those dealing with cultural affairs and trade, as well as U.S. mili-
tary attaches) are encouraged to mix with the local population
and aggressively entertain. Unlike the CIA, neither the State nor
the Defense Departments subject their people to the polygraph.
Hence, State and Defense officials usually provide sounder on the
spot assessments. Diplomats who focus on cultural matters are
particularly productive, as they can mingle freely and snoop
because they have nothing to hide, no secret identities to protect,
and no requests to account for every minute of their day.
The celebrated Daniloff affair illustrates the point. State
Department officials in Moscow immediately concluded that a
Russian Orthodox priest who had offered secret information to the
CIA was an agent provocateur; the CIA wrongly concluded that
the priest was genuine and was caught in the act of trying to
recruit him.
The never-ending conflict between secrecy and intelligence is,
in fact, a vicious circle. It diminishes the value of the Agency’s out-
















ranks. While this serves as a powerful justification for the Agency’s
obsession with counter-intelligence – after all, it only takes one
Aldrich Ames to destroy years of work by thousands of people – it
also raises the question whether money is being spent wisely.
The “tyranny” of pervasive secrecy – according to a former
CIA analyst turned professor, Marvin Ott – has isolated the Agency
from the outside world about which it is supposed to be so well
informed. Its ways are incestuous. People tend to fraternize with
others who inhabit their secret cocoon, Ott says: “The more pro-
fessional contact one has on the outside, the more likely one will
have trouble with the polygraph.”8
My experience as intelligence correspondent for the
Washington Post in 1986-87 left me with the distinct impression
that the Agency is far larger in imagination than in life. Intelligence
is a service industry; its consumers dictate the shape of its pro-
duction. During most of the Reagan years, however, the agency
was headed by William Casey, the president’s campaign manag-
er. Bobby Inman, who served as Casey’s deputy for a year,
described him publicly as an overzealous buccaneer.
Casey had a long-standing love for covert action, dating back
to his OSS experience in World War Two. Reagan had made
Casey a member of the Cabinet, the first time in history that the
CIA director had gained that status. Casey politicized intelligence.
He opposed arms control talks with Moscow. He ignored legal
niceties and sabotaged Secretary of State, George Shultz, in
Nicaragua and Iran, and on arms control. The 1986 Iran-contra
affair revealed that there were whole areas of U.S. activities about
which the Secretary of State and the rest of the government knew
nothing.  Casey had virtually usurped the prerogatives of the
Secretary of State and had run an alternative foreign policy.
Casey could do all these things because he controlled the
analytical process, the estimates, covert action, and counter-intel-
ligence. In his memoirs, Shultz later wrote that Casey’s views
“were so strong and so ideological that they invariably colored his
selection and assessments of materials. I could not rely on what
he said, nor could I accept without question the objectivity of
‘intelligence’ that he put out, especially in policy sensitive areas.”9
Casey had promoted a young Agency analyst, Robert Gates,
as his deputy, largely because of his hardline anti-Communism.
Gates systematically overstated the “evidence” on Soviet arms
procurement programs, and the state of the Soviet economy in
general, in order to buttress his belief that, even after Gorbachev
took power, nothing was changing in the Soviet Union. When
asked by the Senate Intelligence panel on March 16, 1986, what
the Agency was doing to prepare American policy-makers for the
consequences of Gorbachev’s reforms, Gates replied: “Quite


























on, my resources do not permit me the luxury of sort of just idly
speculating on what a different Soviet Union migh look like.”
Most serious CIA analysts did not share Gates’ assessment,
but their voices were not heard. Objections advanced by the
Directorate of Intelligence were quashed. Richard Kerr, the then
DDI, attempted to get a dissenting view (on one of the key indi-
cations of Soviet intentions) which was included as a footnote to
the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic forces; the
footnote, however, never saw the light of day.  
As late as 1988, Gates, in his briefings to Congressional
leaders, portrayed the Soviet Union as “a mighty nation con-
fronting us everywhere – confident, unchanging and determined.”
A full three years after Gorbachev had begun reforms that even-
tually cost him his country and his job, Gates insisted in a speech
that nothing was changing in Russia and that “the dictatorship of
the Communist party remains untouched and untouchable”,
adding that  “a long, competitive struggle still lies before us.” The
man who made these assertions was rewarded. Two years later, he
was appointed director of Central Intelligence.
The author of the unfortunate footnote, Douglas MacEachin,
director of the Office of Soviet Analysis from 1984-89, put it this
way: “The period during which I felt I had the least impact (on pol-
icy) was during the Reagan administration. They thought of us as
the enemy... The implication was that part of the national threat
was that the CIA undercut our ability to rebuild our national
forces. The administration charged the CIA with being too liberal.
It said we underestimated the military threat, underestimated the
Soviet threat in the Third World.”
Kirsten Lundberg, who interviewed scores of CIA officers for
the Harvard study, said many of them “felt that Casey and Gates
had ensured that the (Agency’s) final product made the most
damaging case possible against the Soviets, based on what they
considered flimsy evidence.” Dissenters, however, were intimidat-
ed. Some were accused of being “soft” on Communism. People
whose assessments differed from Casey’s were considered
“Communist sympathizers.”
Robert Blackwell, a senior CIA officer, described the tension in
the CIA headquarters: “It was palpable. Whether anything was
being twisted or recorded upstairs or not, people felt that they
were under an extra burden to somehow be very careful about
how things were said. Papers that were exceptionally hard hitting
and very negative about whatever ... didn’t seem to get quite as
much critique as ones that weren’t, or at least many felt that.”
I dwell upon the politicization of the CIA in an effort to under-
score the basic proposition that all intelligence services are the toy
of the government they serve. On key strategic issues, Casey and















changed the terms of public debate in Washington with respect to
Afghanistan and arms control was extraordinary indeed. Consider
Gorbachev’s speech in February, 1986, when he talked of
Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.” Post editors demanded
changes in my story, which alleged that Gorbachev’s remarks
foreshadowed a decision to withdraw Soviet troops from
Afghanistan – a judgment soon to be confirmed in reality. U.S.
diplomats who reached this conclusion had similar experiences.
The U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Jack Matlock, described the
reaction of his consumers in Washington: “There was an absolute
unwillingness to accept the notion that the Russians might be will-
ing to get out and wanted to finally negotiate. I always attributed
that in part, frankly, to the stake that the CIA had in the coun-
terinsurgency program in Afghanistan.”
Robert Blackwell revealed the result of the inflated projections
of Soviet military power: “Never mind that the Soviet Union never
in ten years, from the late 1970s through the entire decade of the
1980s, ever lived up to the projections that were made... We pro-
jected these huge forces, then used those projections as a ration-
ale for our spending – and they (the Soviets) never lived up to
those projections.”
Bill Casey died in the spring of 1987, but his ghost hovers
over the CIA headquarters at Langley. He and Robert Gates, in my
judgement, inflicted enormous damage on the Agency. The end of
1991 should have been, by any measure, the Agency’s moment
of greatest glory; instead, the CIA came under attack for having
failed the mission for which it was founded. The Bush administra-
tion continued to censor dissenting views within the bureaucracy;
Robert Gates was Bush’s CIA director. Shortly before the collapse
of the Soviet empire, Bush’s vice president, Dan Quayle, publicly
insisted that no real changes were taking place in Russia and
referred to perestroika as “a form of Leninism.”
Did the CIA fail in its mission? I don’t think so. By the very
nature of its mission, the Agency was unable to advertise its
accomplishments. Its failures, by contrast, were widely publicized.
But if you examine the sources of these failures, they were ground-
ed more often than not in actions of political leaders.
Which brings me back to Markus Wolf’s assertion that “how-
ever sharp may be the instincts of an intelligence service, it is
always the toy of the government it serves.” It is unlikely to expect
that the behavior of politicians in the new century will change dra-
matically. Some things never change.
But the CIA does have the capacity to adapt itself to the new
international climate. First and foremost, it must jettison its culture
of secrecy, and its preoccupation with covert action. Critics argue
that the constraints of security have often overwhelmed the


























before the onset of the information age, some of the top officials
of the Reagan and Bush administrations said that they had gained
sufficient information about Russia by reading the New York Times
and the Washington Post. Fritz Ermarth, a retired CIA analyst,
recently published a masterful analysis of the current conditions in
Russia.10 How much could he have added to the national debate
on Russia over the years if he had been free to publish in schol-
arly journals or newspapers?
This is not a theoretical question; it is vital to the way a rea-
sonable government should operate. The fact is that our congres-
sional leaders and policy makers do not have time to read secret
analyses, nor do they react to them the way they do to an Op-Ed
article in the Washington Post.
Ironically, as Lars-Erik Nelson revealed recently, censorship of
U.S. officials dealing with Russian affairs has grown worse since
the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, Clinton administra-
tion support for Boris Yeltsin led to a ban on writings that might
cast doubt on Yeltsin’s competency and corruption.
A former CIA analyst, Robert Steele, who now runs a private
intelligence firm called Open Source Solutions, has openly ques-
tioned the Agency’s secrecy. In a presentation before the
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Street proved that
he could produce more usable information more quickly by using
open sources and the Internet than the CIA could get from its
secret sources (the presentation included satellite photographs
and military battle orders).
This is not to suggest that the United States should contract its
intelligence needs to Steele’s firm. But this is a wake-up call.
Ultimately, what is the purpose of intelligence? It is, I believe, to
provide national leaders with reasonable and accurate assess-
ments about adversaries.
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